Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Disciminatory Damage Awards by Greenberg, Laura
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 28 | Issue 2 Article 5
1-1-2004
Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals
for Mitigating Disciminatory Damage Awards
Laura Greenberg
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura Greenberg, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for Mitigating Disciminatory
Damage Awards, 28 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 429 (2001), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/
vol28/iss2/5
COMPENSATING THE LEAD POISONED 
CHILD: PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING 
DISCRIMINATORY DAMAGE AWARDS 
LAURA GREENBERG * 
Abstract: Traditional determinations of tort damages disadvantage 
plaintiffs in lead paint litigation. When courts rely heavily on race-based 
statistics and closely scrutinize the achievements of the plaintiff'S family, 
low-income and minority plaintiffs suffer the immediate consequences. 
This method of compensation reinforces the notion that the tort system 
reflects the realities of current economics, complete with all its 
inequities. As this Note suggests, however, the tort system should strive 
to mitigate these discriminatory realities rather than remaining 
complacent and content with the status quo. Adopting race-neutral 
statistics and comprehending the psychological theory of resiliency will 
allow courts to begin the damage calculation from a more optimistic 
and less discriminatory perspective. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lead poisoning generally affects young children from low-
income and minority families} It causes a variety of physical and psy-
chological injuries, ranging from attention deficit disorder to mental 
retardation to kidney failure.2 Injured plaintiffs have successfully sued 
landlords and governmental agencies to recover for these injuries.3 
Their compensation in such suits is measured, in large part, by the 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-01. 
1 See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Lead and Lead Poisoning (visited 
Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/r02earth/health/leadpoisoning.htm> [hereinafter 
EPA, Lead and Lead Poisoning]. 
2 See Martha Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk: Lead Paint Poisoning Victims and the 
Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 46, 51 (1990); United States Department of Human Services, 
Public Health Service, Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, Case Studies in 
Environmental Medicine: Lead Toxicity (visited Jan. 15, 2000) <http://wonder.cdc.gov / won-
der.prevguid/pOOOOOI7/ entire.htm> [hereinafter USDHHS, Case Studies]. 
~ See, e.g., Valencia ex reI Franco v. Lee, 123 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D.N.Y 2000); Hiraldo v. 
Kahn, 267 A.D.2d 205 (N.YS. 2d 1999); Parker v. D'Avolio, 664 N.E.2d 858, 864 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1996) (upholding judgment in favor of child in action against landlord for lead 
paint poisoning). 
429 
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calculation of their loss of earning capacity.4 Typically, economists and 
rehabilitation experts rely on both race-based statistics and examina-
tions of the vocational and educational achievements of the plaintiffs 
family to determine the loss of earning capacity.5 
Lead paint plaintiffs-young, poor and often African-American 
or Hispanic-are disadvantaged by the traditional determinations of 
loss of earning capacity.6 Using race-based statistics reinforces the cur-
rent racial discrimination in the work force, ignoring the possibility 
and the social value of upward mobility.7 In addition, dependence on 
race-based statistics assumes that race is and should be the primary 
determinant of individual achievement.s Focusing on the plaintiffs 
family is also problematic for poor minority plaintiffs because it as-
sumes that racism and classism will exhaust their opportunities in the 
same way that it may have adversely affected their relatives.9 In short, 
traditional determinations of loss of earning capacity presuppose that 
the legal system's function is to reflect the disturbing status quo of 
discrimination. lo 
This Note advocates two proposals for combating discriminatory 
damage awards for lead paint plaintiffs. First, courts should adopt 
race-neutral statistics to make economic predictions about a child-
plaintiffs loss of earning capacity.l1 Second, courts should become 
familiar with the psychological theory of resiliency.l2 This theory 
identifies certain "protective" factors within children and in their en-
4 See Martha Chamallas, Q:.lestioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic 
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 73, 75 
(1994) [hereinafter Chamallas, Q:.lestioning]. 
5 See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187,1192-93 (D.D.C. 1996); Armentrout v. Vir-
ginian Railway Co., 72 F. Supp.997, 1001 (S.D. W. Va. 1947); Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 
670,677-78 (Va. 1990). 
6 See generally Mahoney, supra note 2, at 49; Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: 
Deep Structures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463 (1998)[hereinafter Chamallas, Architec-
ture of Bias]; Jennifer Wriggins, Genetics, IQ; Determinism, and Torts: The Example Of Discovery 
In Lead Exposure Litigation, 77 B. U. L. Rev. 1025 (1997). 
7 See Chamallas, Q:.lestioning, supra note 4, at 97. 
8 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 483. 
9 See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 1028-31. 
10 As Professor Martha Chamallas explains, "the past is uncritically accepted as a guide 
to the future, even though most people acknowledge that the past was hardly free of race 
... bias." Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 488-89. 
11 See, e.g., Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427,455 (D.D.C. 1991), 
rev'd on other grounds, Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also 
infra section IV (A). 
12 See generally RESILIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: POSITIVE LIFE ADAPTATIONS 17 (Meyer 
D. Glantz and Jeannette L.Johnson eds., 1999). 
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vironment that increase the likelihood of overcoming adverse situa-
tions such as poverty or racial discrimination. I3 On a practical level, 
resiliency theory encourages experts to broaden the sources for their 
predictions of future earning capacity.I4 In addition, resiliency theory 
has two theoretical consequences for damage awards: it emphasizes 
the speculative nature of predictions about what or who a child could 
become,I5 and it suggests that experts should start from the optimistic 
assumption that children are, in fact, able to overcome adverse obsta-
cles that confront them.I6 
Section I identifies the lead-poisoned population and clarifies the 
physical and psychological consequences of lead poisoning. Section II 
examines monetary damages in lead paint litigation, starting with the 
general method of calculation for adults and then focusing on the 
special case of the child-plaintiff. Section III emphasizes the problems 
that the traditional method of damage calculation poses for lead paint 
plaintiffs. Finally, Section N advocates two proposals to help mitigate 
the discrimination in damage awards for lead paint plaintiffs: the 
adoption of race-neutral statistics and the integration of resiliency 
theory into damage determinations. 
I. EFFECTS OF LEAD PAINT POISONING 
Lead paint poisoning, while dangerous for everyone, tends to 
manifest itself primarily in young childrenP Not only are young chil-
dren more likely than adults to ingest lead paint,IS but children's bod-
ies are particularly susceptible-biologically and developmentally-to 
the effects of lead paint.I9 The poisoned population has other 
defining characteristics, namely that the young children are generally 
13 Meyer D. Glantz & Zili Sloboda, Analysis and Reconceptualization of Resilience, in RESIL-
IENCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12, at 109, 114-115. 
14 See id. 
15 See E. James Anthony, Risk, Vulnerability, and Resilience: An Overview, in THE INVUL-
NERABLE CHILD, 3, 10-11 (E. James Anthony & Bertram]. Choler eds., 1987) (due to the 
enormous diversity of risks to which children are exposed, predictions of the "outcome" 
are extraordinarily complex) . 
16 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 487. See generally David Gelman, The 
Miracle of Resiliency, NEWSWEEK, May 1991, at 44. 
17 See United States Environmental Protection Agency, LEAD: General Information and 
Region 3 Highlights (visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/reg3artd/indoor/lead. 
htm> [hereinafter EPA, LEAD]. 
18 See Theodore I. Lidsky and Jay S. Schneider, Evaluating the Poisoned Mind, 36 ThIAL 
32 (2000). 
19 See id. 
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members of minorities from low-income families. 2o Such families of-
ten occupy the older, deteriorating urban housing where lead paint 
remains prevalent. Their children have high risks of exposure to lead 
paint, especially since the severity of the physical and psychological 
effects oflead paint depends on the amount oflead paint ingested.21 
A. The Poisoned Population 
1. Young Children 
According to the Center for Disease Control (CDC), a person's 
blood lead level is at a dangerous level when it rises above ten micro-
grams per deciliter (10 mg/dL).22 This estimate applies to children 
and adults alike, although it is clear that children under five years of 
age tend to be especially susceptible to lead poisoning.23 Children's 
bodies absorb and retain more lead than adults' bodies, due in part to 
the likelihood of an iron deficiency which greatly increases the risk of 
absorption of lead into the gastrointestinal tract.24 Because children's 
bodies and organs are in the developmental stage, even the slightest 
amount of lead can have a profoundly detrimental effect.25 For chil-
dren under the age of three, the incomplete development of the 
blood-brain barrier increases the risk that lead will seep into the 
nervous system.26 Also, very young children are more likely than 
adults to ingest paint chips or paint dust because they are especially 
prone to hand-to-mouth contact.27 
2. Low-income and Minority Children 
Housing conditions in the United States create another charac-
teristic of the poisoned population: lead poisoned children tend to be 
20 See EPA, Lead and Lead Poisoning, supra note 1. 
21 See USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
22 See Lidsky, supra note 18. It is possible that the CDC will adjust this estimate in the 
future as it has done in the past, lowering the figure to keep up with technological and 
medical developments. See Mahoney, supra note 2, at 51-52. 
23 See Lidsky, supra note 18, at 34 n.3; EPA, LEAD, supra note 17. 
24 See USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2 ("[t]he amount of lead absorbed from the 
[gastrointestinal] tract of adults is typically 10% to 15% of the ingested quantity; for preg-
nant women and children, the amount absorbed can increase to as much as 50%."). 
25 See Lidsky, supra note 18, at 32, 34 n.3. 
26 See USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
27 See Donald E. Lively, The Diminishing Relevance of Rights: Racial Disparities in the Distri-
Imtion of Lead Exposure Risks, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 309, 315 (1994). 
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members of minorities and low-income families. 28 Since over 80% of 
houses built before 1978 contain lead-based paint, families who live in 
older, deteriorating housing have a higher risk of exposure than fami-
lies in the newer communities.29 In addition, urban housing is more 
likely than suburban housing to contain lead paint.30 As low-income 
and minority families are more likely than white families to live in 
older, lower-income, inner city housing,31 it should come as no sur-
prise that the majority of the poisoned population are poor Mrican-
American and Hispanic children.32 
The CDC's ranking of populations at risk for lead poisoning 
reflects this expectation, placing poor children and minority children 
at the top of the list.33 Other studies also acknowledge the identity of 
the poisoned population.34 For instance, a New York City study con-
ducted in 1984 found that Mrican-American children accounted for 
an estimated 60% of children living in standard metropolitan statisti-
cal areas with blood-lead levels greater than 25 mg/ dL.35 A few years 
later, a similar study conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances 
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) surveyed families throughout the 
United States who were significantly below the poverty line and found 
28 See United States Department of Health and Human Services, 1997 News Release: 
Blood Lead Levels Keep Dropping; New Guidelines Proposed for Those Most Vulnerable (visited Feb. 
15, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/releases/97news/97news/bldlead.htm> [hereinaf-
ter USDHHS, 1997 News Release]. 
29 See Lively, supra note 27, at 316; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, What 
Every Parent Should Know About Lead Poisoning in Children (visited Jan. 23, 2000) <http:/ / 
www.cdc.gov/nceh/programs/lead/faq/cdc97a.htm> . 
'0 Lively, supra note 27, at 316. 
'1 USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2 (African-American and other minority groups 
are over-represented in low-income groups as well as in the inner·dties). 
'2 See Lively, supra note 27, at 316. Professor Lively emphasizes the impact of the "white 
flight" phenomenon on racial segregation and increased exposure risk for minorities 
within the past three or four decades: "white flight denotes the process of population re-
distribution in which whites leave a community, usually an older city, and settle in sub-
urbs[,]" thereby creating "newer and predominantly white suburbs and older and largely 
black inner cities ... " and creating the concentration of minority families in urban areas 
with high exposure risks. See id. at 316 n.64, 317. 
" See EPA, Lead and Lead Poisoning, supra note 1. Although children with lead poison-
ing span all socio-economic and racial divisions, the "prevalence of elevated levels, never-
theless, remain highest among inner-city, underprivileged children[.]" See USDHHS, Case 
Studies, supra note 2; see also Lively, supra note 27, at 316-17. 
M See, e.g., Center for Disease Control, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, Child-
hood Lead Poisoning, New York City, 1988 (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http://www.cdc.gov / epo/ 
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtmljOOOOI890.htm>. 
'5 See id. Unfortunately for analysis purposes, these statistics vary widely: the CDC esti-
mated that in 1984, African-American children accounted for 46% of the children at risk. 
See USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
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that, of that group, 68% of children with blood-lead levels above 15 
mg/dL were black and only 36% of the children were white.36 The 
1988 ATSDR study also showed that 26.6% of Mrican-American chil-
dren in the United States had blood-lead levels above fifteen mg/dL, 
whereas only 7.1 % of white children had such elevated levels.37 Then, 
in 1997, a press release from the CDC noted that despite a dramatic 
decrease in blood-lead levels for all Americans, children from low-
income families still exhibited higher levels than other children.38 
The correlation between race, income, and lead poisoning might 
become even more pronounced in the near future. 39 Until recently, 
the general public was exposed to lead through the use of leaded 
gasoline. Now, with increasing restrictions on leaded gasoline, lead 
exposure comes primarily from lead paint.40 Given the fact that low-
income and minority families are more likely to occupy older houses 
with lead-based paint,41 "race and income will become better indica-
tors of the likelihood of exposure to leaded paint, and, consequently, 
elevated blood lead levels. "42 
B. Physical and Psychological Consequences of Lead Poisoning 
Lead poisoning affects children in a myriad of ways depending 
on the extent of the exposure.43 Typically, upon entering the body, 
lead concentrates primarily in the blood, soft tissue (such as the kid-
neys, bone marrow, liver, and brain), and mineralizing tissue (such as 
the bones and the teeth).44 High levels of exposure can cause kidney 
failure and brain swelling that can lead to coma or death.45 High ex-
posure can also result in neurological damage, mental retardation, 
36 See Lively, supra note 27, at 317 (citing Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Reg-
istry, The Nature and Extent of Lead Poisoning in the United States: A Report to Congress 
(1988) [hereinafter ATSDR]) (referring to families with annual income under $6000). 
37 See id. 
38 See USDHHS, 1997 News Release, supra note 29. The CDC press release cites to the 
findings of a National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. See id. 
39 See USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
40 See id.; Lively, supra note 27, at 315 (noting that old water pipes and soil near streets 
and highways pose contamination risks, but stating that primary source of lead poisoning 
is lead-based paint). 
41 See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
42 USDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. Lead poisoning can damage the endocrine system as well, interfering with the 
metabolism of Vitamin D and calcium, and affecting cell maturation and skeletal growth. 
Seeid. 
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cerebral palsy, seizures, and behavioral problems.46 Lower levels of 
exposure can cause reduced IQ, cognitive difficulties, deficits in 
speech and language processing, attention deficit disorder, and full or 
partial hearing loss.47 
Although science and legislation have made significant strides 
towards managing the causes and effects of lead poisoning in recent 
decades, there has been an explosion of lead paint cases brought 
against landlords or governmental housing agencies.48 This article 
focuses on the last stage of this complicated litigation process: the de-
termination of damages. 
II. DAMAGES IN LEAD PAINT LITIGATION 
The determination that a defendant is liable, which is often con-
sidered the final chapter of the litigation, is merely the beginning of 
the story for lead paint plaintiffs.49 Upon issuing a finding of liability, 
the court must quantify and redress the damages caused by the de-
fendant's conduct.5o For the purposes of the damages analysis below, 
the reader should assume that the plaintiff has successfully sued the 
defendant either in negligence or under a state or federal statute.51 
A. Possible Types of Damages and the Negative Results for Minority Plaintiffs 
The successful plaintiff is entitled to all the typical types of tort 
damages, including medical costs, pain and suffering, interruption of 
ordinary daily life, and loss of future earning capacity.52 As the num-
ber of toxic tort cases have increased in both complexity and number 
over the past few decades, 53 tort attorneys have also begun to suggest 
non-traditional damages, such as recovery for future medical testing 
to detect diseases related to the exposure, for increased risk of related 
46 See Mahoney, supra note 2, at 50. 
47 SeeUSDHHS, Case Studies, supra note 2. 
48 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
49 See generally Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6; Chamallas, Questioning, supra 
note 4. 
50 See generally 8 PAUL M. DEUTSCH & FREDERICK A. RAFFA, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 
§§ 108-110 (1982). 
51 See infra note 3. 
52 See Harry L. Miles, Damages for Personal Injury, in DAMAGES IN MASSACHUSETTS LITI-
GATION, § 8, § 8-16 (1993). 
5~ See Parker & Waichman, Lead Poisoning and Its Effects on Children (visited Jan. 23, 
2000) http://usalawinfo.com/lead/cfm. One estimate reported that there were over 1500 
lead-related cases in Boston and Baltimore alone in 1993. See id. (also reporting cities all 
over the country encountering comparable increases); see also Wriggins, supra note 6, at 
1026-28 (despite federal laws regulating use oflead paint, plaintiffs have instituted a "sub-
stantial" number of tort cases against landlords). 
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diseases, for fear of future related diseases, and for a variety of other 
emotional damages.54 In addition, courts often allow punitive dam-
ages.55 The goal of these damages is to put the plaintiff "in the same 
... position [economic or non-economic] as he or she would have 
occupied had he or she not been injured. "56 
Not surprisingly, juries and judges treat minority plaintiffs differ-
ently from white plaintiffs when awarding any type of damages.57 The 
Rand Corporation and the Institute for Civil Justice studied jury trials 
from 1960 to 1979 in Cook County, Illinois, and concluded that com-
pensation for white plaintiffs was 25% greater than compensation for 
black plaintiffs in the same situations.58 Thirty-eight percent of civil 
litigators surveyed in a 1991 New York study noted that white plaintiffs 
received more relief than minority plaintiffs on a regular basis. 59 Simi-
larly, 45% of respondents in an Oregon study (and 60% of minority 
respondents) concluded that juries are likely to award less compensa-
tion to minority litigants than to white litigants.6o 
According to Professor Martha Chamallas, one of the explana-
tions behind lower damage awards is that the tort system consistently 
devalues the potential of minority plaintiffs.61 Basic legal categories, 
such as damages, are infused with racial biases.62 This devaluation is 
particularly harmful in calculations of loss of earning capacity, where 
experts rely heavily on race-based statistics to determine the plaintiffs 
value.63 
54 See Michael A. Pope, Novel Damage Thearies in Toxic Tort Litigation, 497 PLI/LIT 167, 
169 (1994). 
55 See Mark F. Itzkowitz, Lead Poisoning Liability, in MASSACHUSETTS PREMISES LIABIUTY 
§ 5, § 5.10 (1997). Under Massachusetts law, for instance, a property owner might be liable 
for punitive damages of three times the amount of actual damages for failure to comply 
with lead paint regulations. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 199(b) (1994). 
56 Battista v. U.S., 889 F. Supp. 716, 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
57 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 464 ("[m]ost empirical studies in-
dicate that women of all races and minority men continue to receive significantly lower 
damage awards than white men in personal injury ... suits"); see also Chamallas, QJiestion-
ing, supra note 4, at 84-85. 
58 See generally AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: 
WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS (1985); Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort 
Reform: Searchingfor RacialJustice, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761 (1996). 
59 See McClellan, supra note 59, at 774. 
60 See id. 
6! See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 480. 
62 See id. at 467; infra section II(B) (2). 
63 See id. 
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B. Loss of Earning Potential 
1. Significance and Definition 
Tort plaintiffs frequently focus on loss of earning capacity as the 
heart of their request for damages.64 For many tort cases, and particu-
larly for lead paint cases, loss of earning potential is the '''big ticket' 
item of damages, which can make the difference between a modest 
and sizable award. "65 In Floyd v. Fruit Industries, for example, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court noted that for a plaintiff who had an appre-
ciable income before the accident or who was steadily employed, "the 
destruction of earning capacity may well be the principal element of 
recovery .... "66 Loss of earning capacity also has a conceptual 
significance: as a measure of human potential, it reflects societal 
judgments about the worth of the plaintiff as well as the groups to 
which the plaintiffbelongs.67 
In general, damages for loss of earning potential (also called loss 
of earning capacity) represent the difference between the plaintiff's 
potential to earn before and after the accident, which, in a simple 
case, is equal to the actual earned wages before the accident plus a 
calculation that takes into account the possibility of upward mobility.68 
As with all calculations of future damages, loss of earning potential 
must be reduced to net present value 
to establish a level of compensation which recognizes that an 
individual could invest a present amount today in an inter-
est-earning asset and use the interest generated ... together 
with a gradual withdrawal of the principal to compensate 
64 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 480. 
65 [d. 
66 136 A.2d 918, 924 (Conn. 1957); Chamallas, Qy,estioning, supra note 4, at 75. 
67 Cham alias, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 480. 
68 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, §§ 109.00-.01; see al50Anderson v. Litzenberg, 
694 A.2d 150, 161 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (award of damages for impairment of earn-
ing capacity seeks to compensate plaintiff for reduction in ability to earn through personal 
services). When measuring loss of earning capacity, a court must determine the value of 
the plaintiff's "capacity to earn money by [her] labor, physical or intellectual. ... [T]he 
[c]ourt is only indirectly concerned with whether the [plaintiff] would in fact have utilized 
her earning power at any given time so as to produce actual income." Feldman v. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1282 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 
524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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fully for the damages sustained as a result of the loss of fu-
ture earning capacity .... 69 
2. Calculating Loss of Earning Capacity for an Adult 
Predicting future damages is, by its very nature, speculative.7o 
Particularly in the case of lost earning capacity, the fact-finder may 
exercise broad discretion in calculating the exact figure. 71 The most 
successful plaintiffs, however, rely on economists and rehabilitation 
experts who assess productivity, average earnings for the pre-accident 
vocation, growth trends in wages, work-life expectancy, and wages lost 
before the return to the labor market.72 
A rehabilitation expert determines the plaintiff's wage earning 
capacity-both before and after the accident-by analyzing the plain-
tiff's work history and career goals.73 The post-accident earning capac-
ity is relatively easy to determine: the rehabilitation expert evaluates 
the skills of the plaintiff and identifies the highest paying jobs in 
which the plaintiff could function effectively.74 It is more difficult, 
however, to determine the plaintiff's pre-accident earning capacity.75 
Where the plaintiff has an established work identity, such as remain-
69 DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 108.00, at 108-2. 
70 See Meshell v. Lovell, 732 So.2d 83, 87 (La. Ct. App. 1999), writ denied, 744 So.2d 626 
(La. 1999); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ard, 991 S.W.2d 518, 522-23 (Tex. App. 1999). 
71 See Petrus v. Bain, 742 So.2d 739, 744-45 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Meshell, 732 So.2d at 
87 ("[a]n award for loss of earning capacity is inherently speculative and not always calcu-
lable with mathematical certainty"); Wa["Mart, 991 S.W.2d at 522-26 (court unwilling to 
find jury's damage award excessive since evidence was sufficient and jury can rely on own 
sound judgment); Pipgras v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. App. 1992); Tri-5tate Motor 
Transit Co. v. Nicar, 765 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex. App. 1989) (examining particular facts of 
each case to determine loss of earning capacity because loss of future earning capacity "is 
always uncertain and is left largely to the jury's sound judgment and discretion"); see also 
QJ1estioning, supra note 4, at 84 (although experts can provide foundation for damage 
award determinations, juries are not restricted to expert evidence when calculating loss of 
future earning capacity). 
72 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 109.80, at 109-27. According to Professor 
Chamallas, the most significant factors in the determination of loss of earning potential 
are the plaintiff's work-life expectancy and the prediction of the plaintiffs average wages. 
See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 481; see also Larry R. Rogers & Kelly N. 
Warnick, Impaired Earning Capacity: Plaintiff'S Perspective in Proving and Disproving Damages in 
Personal Injury Cases, in P & DD IL-CLE, § 5.2 (1993) (factors include plaintiffs chosen 
livelihood, plaintiff's alternative employment paths, any efforts plaintiff could make to 
improve her condition or lessen detrimental effects that the injury has on ability to pursue 
desired career). 
73 See generally DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 109. 
74 See generally id. §§ 109.10-.80. 
75 See generally id. § 11 O. 
2001] Lead Paint 439 
ing in the same job for twenty years, the rehabilitation expert must 
consider the plaintiffs actual earnings as well as "the ability of that 
individual to receive, hold or absorb additional skills of a vocational 
nature which would in effect increase his potential to earn. "76 
Where the plaintiff does not have an established and consistent 
work identity, the rehabilitation expert must evaluate the plaintiffs 
expressed and implied career goals, as well as the likelihood that the 
plaintiff would actually achieve those goals.77 Some courts have at-
tempted to narrow this prediction: in one wrongful death action, for 
instance, the Illinois Court of Appeals held that evidence of the plain-
tiffs career goals was inadmissible unless the plaintiff could show that 
those goals would have been "reasonably certain" to occur.78 The issue 
on appeal was whether the trial court had erred in admitting testi-
mony from the decedent's colleague that, had the decedent lived, he 
would have become dean of Southern Illinois University.79 The Court 
of Appeals found that because "becoming dean of the University was 
not merely an 'ambition' of decedent's, but rather a goal which dece-
dent had the ability to attain," it was reasonably certain to occur and 
therefore the testimony was admissible.80 
Even with legal limits on the breadth of these predictions, they 
remain speculative. The rehabilitation expert must evaluate the plain-
tiffs skills, intelligence, and adaptability, and translate this hard data 
into a vocational category based primarily on "relevant" statistics 
about the career paths of similarly situated people.81 Because this 
translation becomes the major determinant of the damages for plain-
tiffs with little or no earnings record, it is imperative that the rehabili-
tation expert select a vocational category that reflects the plaintiffs 
"maximum capacity for developing vocational potential and earning 
potential both pre and post accident. "82 If the rehabilitation expert 
predicts a low-paying vocation, the plaintiffs earning capacity will be 
correspondingly low, but if the rehabilitation expert makes optimistic 
predictions, the plaintiff's chances improve for a higher damage 
award.83 
76 See id. § 109.01 at 109-2. 
77 See id. § 109.10 at 109-5. 
78 See Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
79 See id. 
80 See id. 
81 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 109.10 at 109-5,109-6. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
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After the rehabilitation expert has identified the plaintiff's pre-
earning and post-earning capacity in terms of vocational categories, it 
falls to the economist to assign a value to the gathered data and com-
pare the pre-accident earning capacity to the post-accident earning 
capacity.84 The economist must consult a variety of statistics to deter-
mine worker productivity, appropriate growth trends, work-life expec-
tancy, and average earnings for workers in the vocations identified by 
the rehabilitation expert.85 At least until recently, courts and experts 
relied on statistics that were organized according to age, race, and 
gender.86 For example, a United States Department of Commerce ta-
ble on average earnings reports that in 1987, for full-time workers be-
tween the ages of twenty and twenty-four, the mean earnings of black 
men were approximately 16% less than the mean earnings of white 
men.87 Similarly, work-life expectancy-a factor that helps calculate 
loss of earning capacity by predicting how long certain individuals will 
remain in the labor force-is also arranged by gender and race.88 
Data from the 1979 to 1980 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 
show that the work-life expectancy of a thirty year-old white man was 
4.7 years longer than that of a minority man, 8.7 years longer than 
that of a white woman, and 9.2 years longer than that of a minority 
woman.89 
C. The SPecial Case of the Child-Plaintiff 
Lead paint plaintiffs are ordinarily young children from poor, 
minority families.9o Determining loss of earning capacity for these 
plaintiffs is especially speculative, since child-plaintiffs lack an estab-
lished record of earnings, well-developed skills, and expressed career 
goals.91 When confronted with a young lead paint plaintiff, experts 
84 See id. § 110.02 at 110-4 (economist's role is "to quantify the impact of the injury in 
question on the future remaining lifetime earning capacity of the plaintiff"). 
85 An in-depth analysis of the economics of determining loss of earning capacity is be-
yond the scope of this Note. For background information and a suggestion of useful statis-
tical data, see generally id. §§ 109, 110. 
86 See Chamallas, Q)lestioning, supra note 4, at 75. Where the plaintiff has a clearly estab-
lished earnings history, economists do not rely on race- and gender-based statistics to de-
termine earnings; for other calculations, however, such as work-life expectancy, the catego-
rized statistics are deemed crucial. See id. at 80. 
87 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 110.11 [2] at 110-10.1 to 110-10.2. 
86 See Cham alias, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 481. 
89 See id. 
90 See supra, section I (A). 
91 See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1973). 
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often rely on a combination of objective and subjective data to predict 
loss of earning capacity.92 As with an adult plaintiff, objective statistics 
predict work-life expectancy and average wages based, to a large ex-
tent, on the child's race.93 Subjective data focuses on the child-
plaintiff's intelligence and education, as well as the education and 
career paths of her parents and siblings.94 The fact-finder's final calcu-
lation commonly involves a combination of both objective and subjec-
tive factors.95 
1. Speculation and Jury Discretion 
The speculative nature of calculating lost earning potential and 
the amount of discretion bestowed upon the fact-finder is com-
pounded when, as in lead paint litigation, the plaintiff is a young 
child.96 Ordinarily, as discussed above, the rehabilitation expert and 
the economist rely heavily on a pattern of earnings to establish pre-
accident and post-accident earning capacity.97 Where there is no pat-
tern of earnings, experts look to the plaintiff's skills, intelligence, 
adaptability, and career goals. Child-plaintiffs lack not only an estab-
lished earnings history, but also clearly defined skills and measurable 
career aspirations.98 As the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted, 
monetary damages are relatively easy to establish accurately when the 
plaintiff has lived "long enough to show characteristics from which his 
earnings may be anticipated .... A small child, however, presents a 
special problem-absent some extraordinary demonstrations, there is 
nothing individual to go on. ''99 
Child-plaintiffs, however, are not precluded from recovering for 
loss of earning capacity.lOO To the contrary, courts have proven to be 
quite lenient in allowing at least some damages even where there is no 
92 See Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990). The terms "objective" and 
"subjective" are not terms of art or law; rather, I have assigned them based on the types of 
data that they represent. 
93 See supra section II(C) [2]. 
94 See, e.g., Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192-93 (D.D.C. 1996); Armentrout 
v. Virginian Railway Co., 72 F. Supp. 997,1001 (S.D. W. Va. 1947). 
95 See id.; see also Butala, 389 S.E.2d at 677-78 (noting need for "facts and circumstances 
personal to the plaintiff as an individual" because damage estimates calculated solely from 
statistics are too remote and speculative) . 
96 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 110.11 [2], at 110-8. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 78-90. 
98 See D'Amin"a, 481 F.2d at 18. 
99Id. 
100 See, e.g., Murrayv. Sanford, 487 S.E.2d 135, 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). 
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evidence on which to base an award. lOl For instance, in Murray v. 
Sanford, the teenage plaintiff was seriously injured in a car accident.1°2 
Although she had no earnings history and she presented no evidence 
quantifying the monetary loss, the court allowed an award for loss of 
future earnings.103 In cases where the plaintiff is too young to have an 
established earnings record, the court explained, "the amount of 
damages awardable for permanent injury rests in the sound discretion 
of the jury ... [to be exercised] in light of the jury's own common 
observation and experience. "104 
The Texas Court of Appeals exhibited the same liberalism in Pip-
gras v. Hart, where a falling brick column had severely injured a four 
year-old.1°5 Despite a complete lack of direct testimony about the im-
pact of the injury to the child's ability to function and his capacity to 
earn, the court allowed the jury to determine lost earning capacity 
simply from their "common knowledge and sense of justice. "106 
Juries and judges are afforded broad discretion in determining 
damage awards for child-plaintiffs.107 However, cases like Murray and 
Pipgra5-where the parties present no quantifying evidence of the loss 
of earning capacity-are rare; experts generally present extensive in-
terpretations of statistical and personal data to make their predictions 
less speculative. !Os Typically, then, judges and juries base their discre-
tionary decisions on a combination of objective and subjective data.109 
2. Objective Statistics 
For child-plaintiffs who have no established earnings records, 
both statistical averages (objective statistics) and personal data (sub-
jective data) are the determinants in a fact-fInder's discretionary deci-
sion.no Objective statistics, which are the traditional method of de-
101 See id. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. at 136-37. 
104Id. at 136; see also Rubio v. Davis, 500 S.E.2d 367,371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (where no 
earnings history, jury must exercise discretion based on own observation and experience); 
C.T.W. v. B.C.G., 809 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex. App. 1991); Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Ni-
car, 765 S.W.2d 486, 493-94 (Tex. App. 1989). 
105 See 832 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Tex. App. 1992). 
106 Id. at 366. 
107 See, e.g., Murray, 487 S.E.2d at 136; Pipgras, 832 S.W.2d at 366. 
lOB See id.; Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 82-84. 
109 See, e.g., Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990). 
no See id.; see also Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 82-83 (despite theoretical un-
derpinnings for loss of future earning capacity, experts rely on race-based statistics when 
plaintiff has limited or non-existent earnings record); DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, 
2001] Lead Paint 443 
termining loss of earning capacity for adults, project future income 
and work-life expectancy.lll These statistics are arranged primarily 
around race, gender, and age.ll2 
The economic analysis of the objective statistics for a child-
plaintiff is the same as the analysis for an adult,113 In both instances, 
the economist consults gender, age, and race-based tables to predict 
the number of years that the plaintiff would have remained in the la-
bor force and to determine his or her expected average wages.ll4 With 
a child, however, the prediction is especially speculative because the 
averages could change drastically over an entire lifetime. Although 
judges and juries are afforded a large degree of discretion regarding 
child-plaintiffs, the ultimate damage award tends to bear a close rela-
tion to the objective predictions.1l5 
In Drayton, for instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals over-
ruled the District Court's damage award, noting that the trial judge 
had gotten e1I.lotionally involved in the outcome of the case and thus 
accepted the "astronomical projections and assumptions made by 
plaintiffs' expert. ... "116 The plaintiff was a seven year-old Mrican-
American girl who had been severely disfigured from a liquid drain 
cleaner chemical burn.117 Her economist ignored her age, race, and 
gender in his calculations of loss of future income, relying instead on 
the average income standards for male college graduates. lls In re-
sponse, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that despite the broad discre-
§ 110.11 [2]' at 110-8. Deutsch and Raffa point out that the economist is confronted with 
two methods of establishing the earning capacity of a child-plaintiff. See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, 
supra note 50, § 110.11 [2], at 110-8. On the one hand, the economist could rely on data 
from the United States Department of Commerce to "establish average educational levels 
by the sex and race of the plaintiff." See id. Having established an education level, the 
economist then turns towards other data from the Department of Commerce to determine 
a base annual earning capacity. See id. § 110.11 [2], at 110-8 to 110-9. On the other hand, 
there are many cases where the economist relies on subjective data in order to calculate 
loss of earning capacity. See id. This Note is concerned with the cases in the latter category. 
111 See supra section I1(B) (2). 
112 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 483. 
113 See, e.g., Drayton v.Jiffee Chern. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 361-64 (6th Cir. 1978). 
114 See.DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 110.11 [2], at 110-6 to 110-9; Sherri Lamb, 
Toward Gender-Neutral Data for Adjudicating Lost Future Earning Damages: An Evidentiary Per-
spective, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 299, 324 (1996). 
115 See, e.g., Drayton, 591 F.2d at 362. 
116 Id. at 364. 
117 See id. at 355. 
118 See id. at 362. 
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tion, the fact-finder must "keep such extrapolations within reasonable 
bounds and insure that they conform to the evidence. "119 
Until recently, the use of race-based tables and statistics went vir-
tually unchallenged.120 In O'Connor v. United States, a wrongful death 
suit, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the trial judge's 
decision to use a statistic which measured the mortality of the "gen-
eral populace. "121 Instead, the Second Circuit held that the calcula-
tion should be based on a race-specific statistic-that is, a figure that 
measured the life expectancy of white males only.122 The Supreme 
Court of Alaska maintained a similar focus on race and gender in de-
termining the lost earning capacity of a child-plaintiff injured in a car 
accident.l23 The only figures that the court cited related to white Alas-
kan females.l24 In addition, in Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospi-
tal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals complacently accepted the usage 
of race-based tables.125 The court upheld the jury's determination of 
the partial loss of earning capacity, noting specifically that it was based 
on United States Department of Commerce records arranged accord-
ing to race, gender, and age.126 
119 [d. at 362 ("no reasonable person would, in the ordinary affairs ofiife, act upon the 
astronomical projections and assumptions made by plaintiff's expert and accepted by the 
District Court.") . 
120 SeeChamallas, QJlestioning, supra note 4, at 96; see also Lamb, supra note 114, at 316-
18. 
121 See 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959). 
122 See id.; see also Powell v. Parker, 303 S.E.2d 225, 228 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983), review de-
nied by 307 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. 1983) (not questioning the use of race to project future net 
income). 
123 See Morrison v. Alaska, 516 P.2d 402, 404-05 (Alaska 1973). 
124 See id. 
125 See 294 N.W.2d 501, 527 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), afl'd, 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981). 
126 See id.; see also Chamallas, QJlestioning, supra note 4, at 95-97 & 140 n.155 (noting 
that scholars, too, rely on race as a primary determinant in measuring loss of earning ca-
pacity for child-plaintiffs). Until recently, courts also tended to rely heavily on gender-
based statistics to determine loss of earning capacity. See Lamb, supra note 115, at 316-18. 
Although gender-based statistics generally do not have a negative impact on lead paint 
plaintiffs--and therefore are somewhat outside the scope of this Note-there are a wide 
range of interesting cases. See Caron v. United States, 410 F. Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.!. 1976), 
aff'd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976) (paying lip-service to the theoretical notion of equality 
but holding that the determination of prospective earnings must be based on "female 
wages" as defendant suggested, to reflect realistic inequality between sexes); Frankel v. 
United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331, 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afl'd sub nom., Frankel v. 
Heym, 466 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1972) (considering probabilities of marriage, child-bearing, 
child-raising, and traditionally low wages for women to determine loss of earning capacity 
for a female plaintiff). 
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3. Subjective Data 
When appraising a child-plaintiff, the economist ordinarily does 
not make objective predictions for a child-plaintiff unless a rehabilita-
tion expert has produced some subjective data.127 That is, the econo-
mist cannot calculate the plaintiff's work-life expectancy or average 
earnings without some indication as to what type of career path the 
child would have followed had the accident not occurred.128 Subjec-
tive data reflect an examination of the particular plaintiff and the 
members of his or her family.l29 
The rehabilitation expert gathers the subjective data. He or she 
evaluates the plaintiff on educational capacity through IQ and apti-
tude tests, examines the socio-economic status of the plaintiffs family, 
including the education and work history of the plaintiffs parents 
and siblings, and analyzes the family's economic ability to provide 
higher education.130 This subjective analysis is crucial, according to 
one study, because the m.yor determinants of a child's occupation 
are: the father's occupation, education, and income; the child's IQ; 
the number of siblings; the stability of family life; and the birth order 
of the individual relative to his or her siblings.131 The basic assump-
tion of these factors is that, but for the accident, the child-plaintiff 
127 See DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, § 110.11 [2], at 110-8. The subjective data is 
important in all cases where the plaintiff does not have an established work history or 
earnings record. See id. § 109.01, at 109-2. Usually the plaintiff in such a situation is a 
child; it is possible, however, to have an adult plaintiff who lacks an earnings record or a 
work history, thus requiring a rehabilitation expert to synthesize relevant subjective data. 
See Lorenz v. Air Illinois, Inc., 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (rehabilitation 
expert evaluated plaintiff's intelligence and adaptability to determine whether it was rea-
sonably certain that plaintiff would have become dean of the University where he worked 
because plaintiff lacked work history specific to that job). 
128 DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, §110.11 [2], at 110-8. 
129 See id. 
ISO See ill. One study of the methods of analysis advises rehabilitation/vocational ex-
perts to conduct a document review, a client interview, a number of tests and evaluations, 
and then review and analyze the data collected. See Edmond Provder, Using Vocational Ex-
perts in Cases Involving Injured Children, 29 TIuAL 39, 39-40 (1993). In conducting the 
document review, the expert should examine medical records, educational records, and 
psychological records to determine the intellectual ability. See ill. The client interview 
should be geared towards determining the extent of the i~ury, the level of comprehen-
sion, any remaining memory or knowledge, and the effect of the diminished ability on day-
to-day activities. See ill. A history of the parents and siblings should be included in the in-
terview in order to get a baseline on occupational levels, educational levels, earnings, and 
psychological functioning. See ill. The tests and evaluations should be "designed to meas-
ure a specific child's education level and disabling condition." Id. 
151 Christopher J. Bruce, The Calculation of an Infant's Lost Earnings, 22 ALBERTA L. REv. 
291,292-93 (1984). 
446 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:429 
would have followed in the socio-economic footsteps of those around 
him or her.132 
In the 1947 case of Armentrout v. Vitginian Railway Co., where the 
defendant's train struck and injured the four year-old plaintiff, the 
court used subjective data to determine loss of earning capacity.133 
The court found that the jury had discretion to assume that the plain-
tiff would have participated in some recognized trade because he was 
"above average in intelligence, and ... his parents, as shown both by 
evidence and by their appearance and demeanor, [were] respectable 
and moderately well educated people, who would likely give to their 
children good educational opportunities. "134 More recently, in 
Athridge v. Iglesias, a fifteen year-old plaintiff suffered numerous physi-
cal injuries and permanent brain damage as a result of a car accident 
with the defendant.135 To determine the loss of the plaintiffs earning 
capacity, the court looked at a number of factors, including the likeli-
hood that he would graduate from high school, college, or graduate 
school (based on information from the plaintiffs college-prep high 
school), the education of his parents and siblings, and his expressed 
interest in becoming a lawyer.136 
Thus, where the plaintiff is a child, the fact-finder frequently as-
certains the damage award from a combination of objective and sub-
jective data.137 The Drayton court emphasized the importance of the 
objective statistics (based on race, age, and gender) in determining 
damages for a child-plaintiff.l38 The Armentrout and Athridge courts 
relied heavily on subjective information to make their discretionary 
decision-examining not only the plaintiff but also her family, their 
socio-economic status, and their education levels.139 For lead paint 
132 SeeWriggins, supra note 6, at 1055-70. 
153 72 F. Supp. at 999. 
1M [d. at 1001. 
135 Athridge, 950 F. Supp. at 1188-90,1192. 
136 [d. at 1192-93. A Canadian case also illustrates the use of the subjective analysis. See 
Bruce, supra note 132, at 291. The court calculated the expected loss of income for an 
eight year-old boy whose arm had been amputated by considering the child's IQ, his 
speech and grammar problems as an infant, his inadequate performance in school since 
the accident, and that he was fourth in a family of seven. See w. In addition, the court 
noted that the father left home when the child was three and the father worked as a. skilled 
tradesman. See w. The court concluded that, but for the accident, the child would have 
become an unskilled or semi-skilled laborer. See w. 
137 See Drayton, 591 F.2d at 362-64; Athridge, 950 F. Supp. at 1192-93; Armentrout, 72 F. 
Supp. at 1001. 
1!18 See 591 F.2d at 362-64. 
139 See Athridge, 950 F. Supp. at 1192-93; Armentrout, 72 F. Supp. at 1001. 
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plaintiffs, however, this method of calculating damages is detrimental 
and results in inferior damage awards.140 
III. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: DAMAGE DETERMINATIONS ARE 
DISCRIMINATORY FOR LEAD PAINT PLAINTIFFS 
For lead paint plaintiffs, reliance on objective and subjective data 
is harmful.141 Lead paint plaintiffs are almost always young children 
who lack past earnings, vocational experience, well-developed skills, 
and expressed career aspirations.142 Consequently, experts predicting 
loss of earning capacity for lead paint plaintiffs adhere closely to the 
statistics and personal data.143 But these plaintiffs also tend to be 
members of minorities-and the objective and subjective data that is 
so crucial for child-plaintiffs discriminates against minority plain-
tiffs.l44 Lead paint plaintiffs are seriously disadvantaged by this dam-
age award system.145 
A. Problems with Objective Statistics 
Experts and courts who rely on objective statistics reason that, 
despite modern efforts to eradicate disadvantages for minorities, race 
does reflect how these groups fare in the workforce. l46 However, these 
statistics have two significant problems. First, they reinforce the status 
quo of racial disparities, ignoring both the upward mobility of the in-
dividual and the upward mobility of certain groups in society.147 Sec-
ond, organizing the statistics around race propels race to the fore-
front of predictions about individual achievement and fails to 
recognize that many other factors influence an individual's ability to 
fulfill his or her potential.148 
As Professor Chamallas has pointed out, the "traditional accep-
tance of the use of race-based ... economic data creates a pattern of 
140 See generally, Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6; Wriggins, supra note 6. 
141Id. 
142 SeeD'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1973); EPA, Lead and Lead 
Poisoning, supra note 1. 
143 See, e.g., Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990); Chamallas, Questioning, 
supra note 4, at 820-83; DEUTSCH & RAFFA, supra note 50, §110.11 [2], at 110-8. 
144 See Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97; Wriggins, supra note 6, at 1055-70. 
145 See id. 
146 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 483. Professor Chamallas explains: 
"In our society ... race ... matter[s]: being ... an Mrican-American does dampen one's 
earning prospects." ld. 
147 SeeChamailas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97. 
148 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 109,114-15. 
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awards that replicates the status quo by reinforcing the race privilege 
of whites. "149 Relying upon the objective statistics recognizes that mi-
norities, on average, make less money than white people and assumes 
that this discrepancy will continue.l50 The statistics embody inherent 
stereotypes and historical discrimination. Tables of average earnings, 
for instance, reflect traditional wage discrimination and vocational 
segregation.151 Similarly, tables of work-life expectancy reflect the tra-
ditional displacement of minorities into irregular employment with 
few opportunities for upward mobility, as well as higher risks of incar-
ceration for minority men.152 As long as the statistics are organized 
along racial lines, the ensuing damage awards for lead paint plaintiffs 
"assume that the current ... racial pay gap will continue in the future, 
despite ongoing legal and institutional efforts to make the workplace 
more diverse and less discriminatory. "153 Calculations based on these 
statistics exclude the possibility that an individual or a group could 
make great advances over a lifetime.l54 
Race-based statistics exclude consideration of religion, ethnicity, 
or marital status.155 Moreover, the racial focus suggests that race has a 
greater impact on the achievements of a person than other factors 
correlated with success, such as a good-natured personality, a strong 
adult role model during childhood, and well-developed social skills.156 
It is this concentration on race that allows devaluation to negatively 
affect lead paint plaintiffs.l57 That is, the 
willingness to believe that race ... [is a] reliable indicator of 
future earning capacity relates to causal attribution .... 
[T] he use of race to predict future earnings signals a will-
ingness to ascribe the low incomes of Mrican-Americans to 
internal factors, such as lack of motivation, lack of initiative, 
and lack of intelligence. Such a focus on dispositional factors 
149 Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97. 
150 See id. at 75. 
151 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 481. 
152 See id. 
153 See Cham alias, Questioning, supra note 4, at 75. 
154 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 481; Chamallas, Questioning, supra 
note 4, at 75, 84 ("[r]eliance on ... race-specific data to calculate loss of future earning 
capacity assures that predictions about the future are tied to present disparities, disparities 
which are sizable and reinforce the dominant economic position of white men in the 
American economy."). 
155 Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 483. 
156 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
157 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 483. 
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can conveniently explain why the racial income gap will per-
sist in the future, in spite of the formal legal commitment to 
equal opportunity. If this is the case, then negative stereo-
types can become self-fulfilling prophecies as predictions 
about future potential translate into lower damage awards. I5S 
449 
Indeed, lead paint plaintiffs are seriously injured by this devalua-
tion-their youth induces speculative reliance on the objective statis-
tics, and the color of their skin induces the fact-finder to accept (per-
haps unconsciously) stereotypes and historical discrimination.l59 
B. Problems with Subjective Data 
Reliance on the subjective data assumes that child-plaintiffs are 
restricted by the socio-economic, educational, and vocational status of 
their families.l60 For instance, to predict what level of educational 
achievement an injured child would have attained if the accident had 
not happened, experts often focus on the educational level of the 
parents and siblings.161 A lead paint plaintiff is doubly constrained by 
subjective data. As a child, she is constrained by the possible short-
comings of her family; as a member of a minority, she is constrained 
by historical racial discrimination.162 Indeed, "because of the high 
correlation between minority race and lower socio-economic status, 
assessment of the future educational attainment of minority children 
[and therefore the predictions of their earning capacity] will likely be 
negatively affected by the socio-economic situation of their fami-
lies. "163 
The disadvantages of subjective data are also illustrated in the 
discovery phase of lead paint litigation cases. I64 Traditional tort cases 
focus on the individual, assuming that a personal injury plaintiff has 
willingly put her physical and even mental fitness in the spotlight for 
discovery.I65 According to Professor Jennifer Wriggins, however, lead 
paint cases have seen a shift from plaintiff-centered discovery to dis-
158 [d. at 487. 
159 See id. In fact, Professor Chamallas asserts that it is unconstitutional for a court to 
rely on the race-based statistics. See Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 75-76. She ar-
gues that the classifications based on race fail to further a compelling state interest. See id. 
160 See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 1028-30. 
161 See Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 82. 
162 See id. at n.53. 
163 [d. 
164 See generally Wriggins, supra note 6. 
165 See Wriggins, supra note 6, at 1055. 
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covery regarding the plaintiffs family.l66 Lead paint defendants rou-
tinely ask for production of medical, psychological, educational, and 
employment records for relatives and non-parties in order to prove 
that the child's injuries were caused by genetic deficiencies or poor 
parenting rather than by lead poisoning. I67 
In both the discovery context and the damages analysis,I6s this 
shifting focus from the individual to the family is discriminatory 
against poor and minority families. I69 This new focus on the plaintiffs 
social environment "takes place against a powerful historical back-
drop ... of racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, classist intelligence research."170 
This subjective data relies on the assumption that an individual's 
achievement is limited by her genetic inheritance. l7l Historically, "sci-
entific" studies of genetic inheritance were driven by the belief that 
Mrican-Americans were genetically intellectually inferior and thus 
passed their inferiority down to their children.172 This restrictive vi-
sion of minority children correlates with lower damage awards: be-
cause these children could not have overcome the genes they inher-
ited from their parents, the argument goes, their capacity to earn is 
constrained by their race and their parentage.173 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGING TRADITIONAL DISCRIMINATORY 
DETERMINATION OF LEAD PAINT DAMAGES 
The problems with both objective and subjective data should not 
be ignored. This Note advocates two proposals for addressing the dis-
criminatory effects of using this data to determine lead paint dam-
ages. First, courts should substitute race-neutral statistics to calculate 
166 See id. at 1028, 1057-58. "Not surprisingly, in view of the race, gender, and class 
characteristics of many plaintiffs and their families, lead exposure litigation constitutes the 
first area in which litigants systematically seek this type of discovery." [d. at 1088. 
167 See id. at 1058-59. Many courts grant such requests from defendants: "while New 
Jersey and Massachusetts courts have denied defendants' requests seeking examinations of 
plaintiffs' mothers, a District of Columbia court allowed the IQ testing and psychological 
examination of a plaintiff's mother and sibling, New York courts ordered IQ testing of a 
plaintiff's mother in two cases, and a Louisiana court ordered the neuropsychological 
testing of a plaintiff's siblings." [d. at 1058-59. 
168 Professor Wriggins predicted that this broader focus of discovery would soon ex-
tend beyond the lead paint context; certainly, at least, it has extended beyond the discov-
ery realm and into the determination of damages. See id. at 1088. 
169 See id. at 1044. 
170Wriggins, supra note 6, at 1044. 
J7J See id. at 1044-48. 
172 See id. at 1045. 
173 See id. at 1044-48; see alm Bruce, supra note 132, at 291. 
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loss of earning capacity for lead paint plaintiffs-following the lead of 
pioneer courts such as the District of Columbia District Court and the 
Supreme Court of Virginia. I74 In addition, courts should begin to ex-
amine the psychological theory of "resiliency," which examines chil-
dren who flourish despite adverse conditions of poverty or racial dis-
criminationP5 This theory suggests factors other than race contribute 
to achievement. Making use of these factors in calculating loss of 
earning capacity could mitigate current racial discrepancies. I76 
A. Using Race-Neutral Statistics to Determine Damages 
Objective data reinforces the status quo and assumes that race is 
the primary determinant in measuring who and what a child-plaintiff 
would have become)77 To combat the discrimination for young mi-
nority plaintiffs, commentators and lawyers have suggested that courts 
reject the race-based statistics and opt instead for race-neutral statis-
tics.178 As scholar Sherri Lamb asserts, "the most desirable nondis-
criminatory option is to consider each person as equivalent to the av-
erage, unless evidence is produced which removes the plaintiff from 
the normal range."179 
Within the past ten years, some courts have rejected race-based 
statistics to measure loss of earning capacity. ISO In 1990, for example, 
the Virginia Supreme Court held that statistics organized solely 
around race, age, and sex were insufficient to calculate loss of earning 
capacity. lSI The plaintiffs in that case had sued their obstetrician-
gynecologist to recover for birth defects caused by the failure to pro-
174 See, e.g., Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp.427, 455-56 (D.D.C. 
1991), rev'd on other grounds, Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 
Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 677-78 (Va. 1990). 
175 See generally RESILIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12. 
176 See, e.g., Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 109, 114-15. 
177 See supra section III (A) . 
178 See generally Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4. 
179 Lamb, supra note 115, at 338. Lamb focuses on the discrimination that stems from 
gender-based statistics. See id. Gender, like race, affects the calculation of work-life expec-
tancy and average earnings. See id. at 308-15. Courts are likely to assume that a woman's 
work-life expectancy will be affected by marriage, pregnancy, and raising children. See id. at 
316. Also, "because the participation rate [the probability that the plaintiff will be partici-
pating in the work force] for women has been dramatically rising over the past few decades 
toward the male participation rate, the current tables underestimate future work life dura-
tions for women.» Seeid. at 310. 
180 See, e.g., lWleeler, 771 F. Supp. at 454-56; Bulala, 389 S.E.2d at 677-78. 
181 See Bulala, 389 S.E.2d at 677. 
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vide medical care during labor and delivery.182 Ruling that the plain-
tiffs had not proved damages with "reasonable certainty," the court 
commented that "such evidence [of loss of earning capacity] must 
relate to facts and circumstances personal to the plaintiff as an indi-
vidual, not merely to his membership in a statistical class. "183 In other 
words, the court required more than averages based (in large part) on 
race; on their own, such statistics were too speculative to have accu-
rate predictive value.184 
Then, in the 1991 Wheeler case, the District of Columbia District 
Court adopted race-neutral statistics in favor of race-based statistics to 
determine loss of earning capacity.185 The plaintiff was an overseas 
employee of the United States at the time of the injury who sued the 
State Department for failure to provide appropriate medical care to 
her son.186 The defendants appealed the lower court damage award, 
arguing that the award should be reduced to conform to race-based 
statistics.187 The court, however, held that "it would be inappropriate 
to incorporate current discrimination resulting in wage differences 
between the ... races or the potential for any future such discrimina-
tion into a calculation for damages resulting from lost wages. "188 In-
stead, the court employed a measurement of average earnings of all 
American college graduates without regard to race.189 The court con-
182 See id. at 672. 
183 Id. at 678. 
184 See id. The initial shift away from race-based statistics is mirrored by a minority of 
courts in the gender realm. See Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 976, 997 (D.R.I. 1987), 
aff'd in part and remanded, 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1988); Caron v. United States, 410 F. 
Supp. 378, 398 (D.R.1. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976). Judge Pettine of the Dis-
trict Court of Rhode Island presents a good example of this shift. In 1976, he rejected 
plaintiffs' request for a damage award based on gender-neutral data in Caron. See 410 F. 
Supp. at 398. Despite the court's sympathy towards equality in employment, Judge Pettine 
explained, the court would base its determination on the reality of the inequality in the 
average earnings of the sexes. [d. But then, eleven years later, Judge Pettine changed his 
mind and adopted gender-neutral data. See Reilly, 665 F. Supp. at 997. He wrote: 
Id. 
As a factual matter, I seriously doubt the probative value of [a gender-based] 
statistic with respect to twenty-first century women's employment patterns, 
particularly in light of current, ongoing changes in women's labor force par-
ticipation rates .... [In fact,] both federal and state authorities within the ju-
risdiction counsel against such disparate treatment. 
185 See lWlReler, 771 F. Supp. at 455-56. 
186 See id. at 429-30. The child-plaintiff was half-black and half-white. See id. at 455. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
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eluded that using race-neutral data was the best method of maintain-
ing accuracy while eliminating discrimination.19o 
Interestingly, the It'heelercourt's decision to forego the use of data 
based on either race or gender resulted in a damage award for the 
plaintiff that was even lower than the defendant had suggested.191 
That is, the average wages for all persons turned out to be lower than 
the average black male wages.192 The court made a corresponding 
award for this plaintiff.193 
Widespread adoption of race-neutral statistics for lead paint 
plaintiffs could help mitigate the current racial discrimination in 
damage awards.194 Rejecting race as a determinant will help courts 
break free from the status quo of discrimination within the work-
force.195 In theory, using race-neutral statistics allows for the possibility 
that the current racial discrepancies will be relieved.196 In practice, 
however, when courts use statistics which are both race- and gender-
neutral, they might actually reduce damage awards for all plaintiffs, as 
in the l'Vheeler case.197 But decreasing the focus on race does, at least, 
encourage courts to look to other factors to predict an individual's 
potentiaI.198 The psychological theory of resiliency suggests factors 
beyond race that impact a child's potentiaI.l99 These factors may work 
to overcome the practical effects of using race-neutral statistics by in-
creasing the recovery for lead paint plaintiffs.2oo 
B. Introducing Resiliency Theory into Damage Determinations 
Adopting race-neutral statistics is only one of the ways in which 
courts can mitigate the disappointing and discriminatory damages for 
lead for lead paint plaintiffs. A second proposal comes from the psy-
chological/ developmental theory of resiliency.201 Resiliency theory is 
190 See Wheeler, 771 F. Supp. at 456. 
191 See id. at 455-56. 
192 See id. Apparently, incorporating female wages into the calculation of average wages 
reduced the award significantly. See id. at 456; Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97. 
19~ See Wheeler, 771 F. Supp. at 455-56. 
194 See id. 
195 SeeChamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97. 
196 See id. at 75. 
197 See Wheeler, 771 F. Supp. at 455-56; Chamallas, Questioning, supra note 4, at 97 (not-
ing that Mrican-American men are disadvantaged by race-based data but tend to benefit 
from gender-based data). 
198 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See generally RESILIENCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12. 
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useful on three levels. First, it identifies concrete factors-other than 
race-that indicate a likelihood of success despite adverse condi-
tions.202 Second, the multitude of resiliency literature confirms that 
predictions about what a child is likely to become are enormously 
speculative.203 And third, resiliency theory provides a theoretical al-
ternative to the devaluation of racial minorities by starting with the 
optimistic assumption that children are very much capable of suc-
ceeding beyond the averages and against the odds.204 
Traditionally, child psychology and development research has 
focused on why children fail. 205 This pessimism is the same pessimism 
that infiltrates the measurement of damages in lead paint cases: it is 
grounded in a basic assumption that children in adverse situations will 
be constrained by those situations and will fall victim to adversity. 206 
Resiliency theory, on the other hand, is unique because it starts from 
the proposition and expectation that "there are kids in families from 
very adverse situations who really do beautifully, and seem to rise to 
the top of their potential, even with everything else working against 
them."207 
In its simplest and least technical form, the study of resilience 
examines how people respond to stress and adversity.208 In other 
words, a resilient child is one who has delayed or defended against 
the developmental problems that were expected and predicted in 
light of the child's biological or psychological status, or the child's 
202 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
203 See Anthony, supra note 15, at 10-11. 
204 See generally Gelman, supra note 16. 
205 See id. at 44. 
206 See id. 
207Id. (quoting Dr. W. Thomas Boyce, Director of Behavioral and Developmental Pe-
diatrics at the University of California, San Francisco) . 
208 See Michael Rutter, Psychosocial Resilience and Protective Mechanisms, in RISK AND PRO-
TECTIVE FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 97, 97 (Jon Rolf et al. eds., 
1990). Howard B. Kaplan, a sociologist at Texas A&M University, emphasizes the 
difficulties in defining, applying, and manipulating resiliency theory. See Howard B. Kap-
lan, Toward an Understanding of Resiliency: A Critical Review of Definitions and Models, in RESIL-
IENCE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12. He first queries whether resilience is an outcome 
or a factor that influences the outcome: is resilience the good outcome stemming from an 
at-risk situation, or does it represent the qualities that enable an individual to effect a good 
outcome? See id. at 19-23. As other experts have noted, such "[d]efinitional diversity re-
sults in sometimes disparate profiles of competent adaptation as well as in different esti-
mates of rates of resilience among similar groups." See id. at 23. Kaplan also warns that 
resiliency theory necessarily encompasses normative judgments regarding what constitutes 
risk factors, desirable outcomes, and developmental milestones. See id. at 30-31. 
2001] Lead Paint 455 
surrounding environment.209 As one scholar noted, "[r]esilience is a 
quintessentially U.S. concept. It has roots in the U.S. hero myth 
commemorated in ["rags-to-riches"] books and stories by Horatio Al-
ger .... "210 
Despite methodological variances,211 resiliency studies identify 
certain "risk" factors, which create adverse conditions for children, 
and "protective" factors, which help children cope with stress.212 "A 
risk factor is an individual attribute, individual characteristic, situ-
ational condition, or environmental context that increases the prob-
ability" of an undesirable outcome.213 Extreme poverty is one of the 
most widely identified risk factors. 214 Protective factors, which can 
neutralize and sometimes overcome the risk factors, include both in-
dividual characteristics215 as well as environmental characteristics: in-
telligence, social skills, easy disposition, good-natured personality, 
strong attachment to parents, and association with a good school and 
other pro-social institutions.216 
In 1982, social psychologists Emmy E. Werner and Ruth S. Smith 
published a study of 698 people on the Hawaiian island of Kauai.217 
One third of those surveyed had been born into families affected by 
209 See Kaplan, supra note 208, at 23. 
210 [d. at 30 (quoting L.C. Rigsby, The Americanization of Resilience: Deconstructing Research 
Practice, in EDUCATIONAL RESILIENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 85, 85 (Margaret C. Wang & 
Edmund W. Gordon eds., 1994». 
211 See Kaplan, supra note 208, at 23. 
212 See, e.g., EMMY E. WERNER & RUTH S. SMITH, VULNERABLE BUT INVINCIBLE: A LON-
GITUDINAL STUDY OF RESILIENT CHILDREN AND YOUTH 154-55 (1982); Glantz & Sloboda, 
supra note 13, at 109, 114-15. According to Kaplan, "risk" has been used to refer to likely 
negative outcomes, to specific early predictors of later unfavorable outcomes, and as a 
descriptive term for negative life conditions. See Kaplan, supra note 208, at 36. Kaplan 
notes that there are two ways to define protective factors: "as individual or environmental 
characteristics that reflect the absence of risk factors or the presence of ameliorative fac-
tors, and, as variables that mitigate the effects of risk factors or strengthen ameliorative 
effects." [d. at 46. The latter definition is the more widely accepted definition. See id. 
213 Kaplan, supra note 208, at 37. 
214 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 115. 
215 Although resiliency theory can be used for social justice, as in this Note, there is 
also a controversial political risk in recognizing "built-in defenses" in children. See Gelman, 
supra note 16, at 44,46-47. Politically conservative groups, advocating fewer federal social 
services, have seized the notion of resiliency to demonstrate that people can overcome 
poverty without federal aid. See id. Lisbeth Schorr, a lecturer in social medicine at the Har-
vard Medical School, explains that "[t]he conservative argument against interventions like 
Operation Head Start and family-support programs is that if these inner-city kids and fami-
lies just showed a little grit they would pull themselves up by their own bootstraps." See id. 
at 47. 
216 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
217 See generally WERNER & SMITH, supra note 212. 
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poverty, divorce, alcoholism, mental illness, and physical abuse.218 De-
spite these conditions, however, 25% of this subset matured to lead 
stable, satisfying lives.219 The authors of the study found that certain 
characteristics allowed these individuals to overcome the risks that 
confronted them from birth: 
the age of the opposite-sex parent (younger mothers for re-
silient males, older fathers for resilient females); the number 
of children in the family (four or fewer); the spacing be-
tween the index child and the next-born sibling (more than 
[two] years); ... the amount of attention given to the child 
by the primary caretaker(s) in infancy; ... the presence of 
an informal multigenerational network of kin and friends in 
adolescence; and [a low] cumulative number of chronic 
stressful life events experienced in childhood and adoles-
cence.220 
At the core of resiliency theory is the realization that children living 
under extreme conditions (such as poverty) can rise far beyond what 
is expected of them.221 
For lead paint plaintiffs, this notion can have a significant impact. 
Practically speaking, resiliency theory argues against full reliance on 
the objective and subjective data.222 In identifying specific protective 
factors, resiliency theory encourages experts to broaden the sources 
for their predictions of future earning capacity, no longer relying on 
race and gender as the sole determinants.223 Although it remains to 
be seen how exactly an expert could measure the protective factor 
and its precise impact, resiliency theory offers the possibility of miti-
gating the current overwhelming discrimination against lead paint 
plaintiffs.224 
Using resiliency theory to determine loss of earning capacity also 
has two theoretical consequences. First, a review of the resiliency lit-
erature confirms that loss of earning capacity is a speculative and in-
exact prediction.225 Psychologists have spent enormous amounts of 
218 SeeTerence Monmaney, Kids Who Bmtnce Back, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 12,1988, at 67. 
219 See ill. 
220 WERNER & SMITH, supra note 212, at 155. 
221 See Gelman, supra note 16, at 44, 47. 
222 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15; supra Section III. 
223 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
224 See WERNER & SMITH, supra note 212, at 155; Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 
114-15. 
225 See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 15, at 10-11. 
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time and energy trying to discern exactly how children manage to 
function well when confronted with poverty or racial discrimina-
tion.226 Courts have consistently recognized the speculative nature of 
predictions of what a child would have become.227 Although experts 
have tried to ground their predictions in subjective and objective 
data,228 resiliency theory suggests that courts should be open to other 
sources of data in calculating damage awards.229 
Finally, resiliency theory challenges the often fatalistic vision that 
economists and rehabilitation experts develop in relation to at-risk 
children.23o Statistical averages and examinations of the plaintiff's 
family assume that the child will not succeed beyond the predicted 
averages for education, socio-economic status, and vocational oppor-
tunities. 231 Resiliency theory, on the other hand, begins with the as-
sumption that children do succeed.232 As psychologist Ann Matsen ex-
plains, although "extreme adversity can have devastating effects on 
development . .. our species has an enormous capacity for recov-
ery. "233 Recognizing and rewarding lead paint plaintiffs for their ca-
pacity to recover, rather than punishing them with low damage awards 
based on the color of their skin, is a simple step towards eradicating 
racial discrimination in the tort system and in the legal system. 
CONCLUSION 
Lead poisoned children have been inadequately compensated for 
their injuries. Their age-and the absence of any earnings history or 
defined career path-encourages courts to rely heavily on statistics 
and to judge the children within the context of the achievements of 
their family members. For children from low-income and minority 
families, however, this reliance reinforces historical discrimination 
and results in damage awards that reflect subtle but pervasive racism 
and classism. 
226 See generally WERNER & SMITH, supra note 212. 
227 See, e.g., Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670, 678 (Va. 1990). 
228 See Athridge v. Iglesias, 950 F. Supp. 1187, 1192-93 (D.D.C. 1996); Armentrout v. 
Virginian Railway Co., 72 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (S.D. W. Va. 1947); Bulala, 389 S.E.2d at 677-
78. 
229 See Glantz & Sloboda, supra note 13, at 114-15. 
230 See supra Section III (A). 
231 See Chamallas, Architecture of Bias, supra note 6, at 487. See generally Gelman, supra 
note 16. 
232 See Gelman, supra note 16, at 44, 4~7. 
233 See id. at 47. 
458 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:429 
There is no magic formula to calculate a child's worth. Tort law 
requires a mathematical figure in order to compensate the victim. 
Consequently, courts should begin with the assumption that every 
child has the potential to surpass the conservative predictions of an 
economist or a rehabilitation expert. To implement this assumption, 
courts must expand the focus of damage awards for lead paint plain-
tiffs beyond race and socio-economic status. Adopting race-neutral 
statistics and integrating resiliency theory into damage awards are 
steps towards a less discriminatory theory of compensation and a 
more optimistic and accurate determination of a child's potential. 
